Prigozhin's Manifesto Rant - translation
As Prigozhin has threatened to retreat from Bakhmut by midnight May 10, he continues to make puzzling statements that insinuate an internal war against the current Russian regime.
First, relevant twitter threads in chronological order that lead up to this. Click on each image to be taken to complete content. Your continued support is very much appreciated. You can subscribe to continue to allow us to do this work.
Prigozhin’s May 6th Manifesto (machine translation) on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/igorsushko/status/1654971447142678528
TEXT:
Prigozhin has published a manifesto rant. He appears ready to defend the motherland from all enemies, foreign and domestic.
TRANSLATION:
Yevgeny Prigozhin's answers to society's main questions In order to avoid misinterpretations, I will answer the main questions that society has for me and for the PMC "Wagner".
I. What was Wagner PMC doing in Bakhmut? Why was Bakhmut needed?
1. PMC "Wagner" entered the territory of Pervomayskoye settlement on March 19, 2022, due to the fact that the Russian Armed Forces could not cope with the task, to advance the front in the western direction and to break through the defense of the AFU on the line of 2014.
2. PMC "Wagner" successfully coped with the task of breaking through the fortifications of the AFU defense, the first point of which was Popasna, by May 9, 2022. The presence of these fortifications was not included in the plans of VAS. We were supposed to take Popasna by May 14-15, but stubbornly to do it traditionally by Victory Day.
3. After fleeing the units of the Defense Ministry from the Kherson, Nikolaev, Kharkov and Lugansk regions (Krasny Liman, Kupyansk, Izyum), units of PMC Wagner held back the onslaught of the enemy on the front 148 km long, while putting up positions on the part of the front 38 km long in a day.
4. On October 8, 2022 together with the Army General Sergey Surovikin was decided to start the operation "Bakhmut meat grinder" - assault of Bakhmut settlement to provoke Vladimir Zelensky to throw in as much forces as possible to hold Bakhmut. In Bakhmut we were grinding the AFU, hence the name - "Bakhmut meat grinder".
5. The purpose of the Bakhmut Meat Grinder operation was to enable Russian army units to occupy advantageous defensive lines, mobilize, re-equip, train their personnel, and increase their combat potential.
6. The period of operation together with Army General S. Surovikin was accepted as 6 months (conditionally until April 8, 2023).
7. The settlement of Bakhmut has no strategic importance for further advance westwards.
8. The capture of the settlements of Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka - the "Donbass Ring" - is of strategic importance for the advancement of the Russian army, west of which flat areas open up, on which it is difficult for the AFU to hold defenses in case of an attack by superior forces of the Russian army. II. Why was there a "shell famine"?
9. Against the backdrop of the promotion of the Wagner PMC, which occupied 1,500 square kilometers and 71 settlements, the Russian Defense Ministry has suffered setbacks: defeats at the fronts, lack of control, mobilization scandals, problems with supply, discipline, and so on.
10. To compensate for their failures, because of jealousy, while trying to intrigue the Ministry of Defense decided to begin to oppose the Wagner PMC: - Recruitment of volunteers among prisoners was banned; - stopped the supply of weapons; - the supply of ammunition was cut to 30% of requests (from May 2023, it was cut to 10%).
11. the Ministry of Defense created other problems as well: - The issuance of well-deserved orders and medals to the dead was stopped; - The Wagner PMC was denied the ability to fly personnel from Africa to the CFA zone; - Persons from the Ministry of Defense interacting with the Wagner PMC were banned from communicating with the Wagner PMC units; - special communications were disabled; - planes were denied for the prompt transfer of ammunition.
12. Despite the opposition of the Ministry of Defense, the Wagner PMC continued to successfully conduct combat operations.
13. In order to ensure a complete "shell blockade", which is not an artificial shortage of shells, but the complete cessation of supply, Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev has been dismissed.
14. The Wagner PMC has an opportunity to purchase shells in other ways, not from the Russian army reserves. However, assistance in their own supply and production of ammunition by the Wagner PMC together with foreign partners was denied.
III. Why is the Wagner PMC leaving Bakhmut?
15. The Wagner PMC has been at war for almost 400 days, since March 19, 2022. Virtually all the units after military operations (for which, according to all current military standards, 25 days are allowed) are withdrawn for re-forming, retraining and rest.
16. For seven months of "Bakhmut meat grinder," the Wagner PMC has lost its combat potential. The reason for this was the restrictions in the admission of personnel, created in February 2023, the lack of the required amount of weapons, the lack of the necessary amount of ammunition (artificially created "shell hunger").
17. It should be noted that the "Bakhmut meat grinder" operation was designed primarily not to take the Bakhmut settlement, but to grind down the AFU units and organize a respite for the Russian army to restore its combat effectiveness.
18. The Bakhmut meat grinder fully accomplished its task.
19. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said on March 7, 2023, that taking control of Bakhmut would open the way for a further offensive deep into the Ukrainian army's defense. He described Bakhmut as an important defense node for Ukrainian forces in the Donbass. In the direction of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, the operational space is already open, and the remaining 2.42 square kilometers is of no importance for the operational space. IV. What will the Wagner PMC do after leaving Bakhmut?
20. After leaving Bakhmut, the PMC Wagner will go to training camps to restore combat readiness, to train additional units, and will remain there until the threat to Russia and Russian citizens in the framework of the military operation is removed. In case of a threat, of course, the PMC Wagner will immediately stand up to defend their country.
21. Most of the men and commanders joined the PMC Wagner, leaving the units of the Ministry of Defense, as they completely lost confidence in them. Therefore, the units of PMC Vagner decided that it is impossible for them to join the structures of the Ministry of Defense. It should also be noted that the Wagner PMC is a team of like-minded people. Most of the "Wagnerians" would better retire than to transfer to other units. PMC "Wagner" is not a place of service, it's a calling and philosophy. V. How is the ammunition rate calculated? (All figures are somewhat distorted, but the general sense and proportions are maintained.)
22. So, how the calculation of ammunition is done. Let us take the notional grouping of the "Wagner" PMC of 30 thousand men on the combat missions in Bakhmut. - Opposite the "Wagner" PMC is the enemy of about 80 thousand people. And directly in Bakhmut agglomeration there are about 35 thousand enemy troops.
- During the offensive, the standard ratio of forces under the regulations must be 3:1. That is, for every defender there are three attackers.
- When the grouping of 35 thousand people and the number of weapons [X], the PMC "Wagner" shall be 105 thousand people and the number of weapons [X] x 3.
- Thus, combat capabilities of PMC "Wagner" shall exceed the potential of the enemy by three times.
- In fact, combat potential of PMC "Wagner" is less than the enemy's combat potential by 1.2-2 times (that is, 3.6-6 times less than is required for offensive actions).
- Despite the lack of number of units, weapons and ammunition, the PMC "Wagner" compensates this deficiency with a serious advantage in the level of organization, cooperation and training.
23. The Vagner PMC consumes an average of 6,000 rounds of ammunition per day. And submits its requests based on the required number, based solely on the experience of previous days.
24. Prior to May 2023, DOD leadership signed off on between 10 and 30 percent of the ammunition requirements specified in the requisition - depending on the period. However, through the actions of the responsible DOD officers, we were able to receive more than what was signed - namely, 30 to 60 percent of the requirement.
25. Thus, on average, from October 2022 through May 2023, we received 38% of the requested requirement.
26. The same situation with weapons and military equipment: the provision of tanks, artillery and armored vehicles by the Wagner PMCs was 30-40% of the required amount to perform the combat missions.
27. How to calculate the required amount of ammunition? There are many different options:
- First: from the experience of combat operations, taking into account the number, including missing tanks, artillery, armored vehicles and armaments from the previous period. The way we believe is the most practical option.
- The second: according to the norms defined by the Rules of Firing and Fire Control, the consumption of ammunition to suppress an enemy platoon stronghold is 180 rounds per 1 hectare. The average length of the front line of the Wagner PMC, taking into account the different periods is 80 km. That's about 400 enemy strongholds. To suppress them we need 180 x 400, that is 72,000 rounds per day. And so every day.
- The third one: to suppress one NATO mechanized division for the conditional operation (25 days) about 270 thousand shells (152 mm) are necessary, according to the method of operational-tactical calculations. One NATO division is 12 thousand men. 35,000 is three divisions. Three divisions - 270 thousand times 3 (for suppression) - 810 thousand shells. Divided by 25 days - we get 32 thousand shells per day for suppression.
28. Let me remind you: we asked for 6,000 shells a day, they signed for 600 to 1,000 shells, and we received 1.5 to 2,000 shells a day.
29. For example, not to reveal secrets: 10 items of ammunition that were ordered for the first ten-day period of May. The Wagner PMC requested 45 thousand, 5,800 shells were signed for issue.
30. Thanks to Colonel General Mizintsev for issuing a little more than he signed in the General Staff. Extremely little, but at least something. Since May 1, after his dismissal, they have not issued any more at all.
VI. What is the effect of ammunition shortages on casualties?
31. To maintain combat effectiveness during a full-scale war, losses ("200th" and "300th") of 10-12% in 25 days (the duration of a conventional military operation) are considered acceptable. The arithmetic is very simple:
- If they give 18,000 rounds a day, the casualties are 10%;
- If they give 6,000 shells a day, the losses are 24%;
- If they give 2,000 shells a day, losses are 35% or more. No one calculates 10% of the ammunition from the norm. In such a case, the unit is doomed to perish. Now we get 10%.
32. PMC "Wagner" according to military calculations should give 18 thousand shells per day. And there should be arms [X] x 3. In this case, the losses would be 10-12% in a full-fledged war. The "Wagner" PMC had a number of weapons not [X] x 3, but [X], so we asked not 18, but 6 thousand shells. In this situation, our losses should have been 24%, with 6 thousand shells. But we were given 2 thousand, thanks to the efforts of the responsible generals and Mizintsev. So our estimated losses should have been 35% for every 25 days. That is the Wagner PMC for six months of "Bakhmut meat grinder" was to lose 200% of personnel.
33. It should be noted that at a loss of 30% the unit is considered as not combat ready. We were supposed to perform one combat task (25 days): die and reformat, and so 14 times in a row. Instead, we have somehow been fighting for 14 months in a row. This shows the insane effectiveness of the Wagner PMC. These are standard calculations, which are taught in the General Staff.
34. Of course, losses, once again, due to the highest level of training, management and cooperation, are lower than estimated. But the PMC "Wagner" still suffered significant losses, and despite this, we are still alive, as cooperation, control and morale are not lost.
35. PMC "Wagner" has been artificially brought to the unreadiness at the expense of artificially created "shell hunger".
36. How do we survive? The answer is simple. Management, optimization, military cunning, cooperation, immediate repair, restoration and modernization, both of military equipment and personnel, which, if injured, goes through a quick recovery course and again rushes to fulfill the combat missions. Because we are a monolithic team of like-minded men.
37. These qualities allowed us to grind out about 50,000 AFU soldiers killed and prevent the enemy's counteroffensive to this day along the entire front line.
VII. Where are the shells?
38. The Russian military industry has reached the volume of production of ammunition sufficient to fully support about five combat-ready formations such as the Wagner PMC, with a front length of 120-150 km and simultaneous offensive on all parts of the front.
39. The volume of weapons and ammunition supply allows to provide all, including the normative quantities.
40. We can say with confidence that two-thirds of the sanitary losses of the "Wagner" PMC are caused solely by artificially created "shelling hunger". These are the tens of thousands of dead and wounded citizens of the Russian Federation, who were killed and seriously injured due to artificially created "shell famine".
41. It should be taken into account that many other units are also experiencing a "shell famine". It was assumed that if they get the shells, they will share them with the Wagner PMC. Therefore, the termination of the Wagner PMC would have a positive impact on other units and units, and would provide them with ammunition.
END OF TRANSLATION (Note - this is all machine translation. Translation errors definitely possible.)