What the Russian Armed Forces are preparing and why Gerasimov was appointed to command the military
Translation of Volya Media article dated January 16th about the next large-scale offensive by Russia in Ukraine
Very brief outline of key points was published last night. Translation of the entire article follows below.
TRANSLATION:
What the Russian Armed Forces are preparing and why Gerasimov was appointed to command the military
The appointment of Valeriy Gerasimov, head of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, as commander of the group of Russian troops in Ukraine took place on January 11.
The Russian opposition media and channels have been discussing that this was the result of a back-and-forth struggle between Shoigu, Prigozhin, and Kadyrov. In reality, however, the logic behind Gerasimov's appointment lies exclusively in the military sphere. And here is why.
There is no serious conflict or split in the Russian "elites," nor is there an elite in the European or American sense of the word. There is a group of individuals who have each received their own portion of the economy, industry, resources, or access to public money. All but two or three of these individuals have neither the ability nor the resources to run their own game and create their own political future as a new force within Russia.
The versions of political analysts close to Mikhail Khodorkovsky that everything is about to collapse, that Prigozhin and Kadyrov have almost finished off Shoigu and have taken over the Ministry of Defense and the army are nothing more than the blind belief that such a conflict exists.
For years, Mikhail Borisovich (Khodorkovsky) has been convincing everyone who works with him that Putin's entourage cannot stand Putin, that they will throw him out and replace him, that they are fighting among themselves. They are indeed fighting among themselves, but not to replace Putin, but exclusively for another fat slice of the common pie.
These tensions (among the 'elite') have been fueled by Putin himself for many years. It is convenient for him to be above the fray and to vary the degree of his support to one or the other (of the elites). To be an arbitrator or, what is dearer to him, an authority to whom people come for a trial by convention.
In this game, all the participants follow one main rule: never challenge Putin's power and never touch those whom Putin has put in charge of key areas of his life.
This includes the army, the Federal Guard Service, the defense industry, and the oil and gas sector. Where people were placed not according to their abilities, but according to a high level of personal loyalty to Putin.
Igor Sechin is as much an oilman and businessman as Sergei Shoigu is a military man. The commander of the Rosgvardia, Viktor Zolotov, is nothing more than Sobchak's personal bodyguard.
And they are all completely dependent on Putin and will never do anything that goes against his interests. Not out of nobility, but out of fear.
Everyone in the game knows perfectly well that for such loyalty Putin makes these people untouchable to the other members of the pack.
To attempt to remove any of them through intrigue, or even just to interfere with their plans - is to sign your own sentence (for example, for fraud or bribery on a particularly large scale, ask former Finance Minister Ulyukayev).
Therefore, all the stories about Prigozhin and Kadyrov's plans for Russian domination by overthrowing Shoigu are nothing more than speculation and wishful thinking.
Prigozhin and Kadyrov are nothing more than screws in the mechanism, but not independent players.
When in the fall the Russian opposition said that General Lapin, Shoigu's protege, was dismissed from his post because of a conflict with Prigozhin and Kadyrov, our sources in the General Staff and the group headquarters twiddled their thumbs and laughed merrily.
Lapin was removed because of a consistent pattern of mistakes. And he made them because he was incapable of making independent decisions and responding to the changing situation.
The general was recalled and given a break, but he did not fall into disgrace or blacklisting.
Kadyrov and Prigozhin's public attacks on Lapin, first of all, did not go beyond tg-channels (there was no conflict at all in the official Russian media), and second, they were caused by Lapin's arrogance with the Chechen and PMC units, whom he wanted to give orders to and even managed to do so, while Kadyrov and Prigozhin took offense.
Now about Gerasimov himself. He was the author of all the plans for the seizure of Ukraine that the Russian Armed Forces have been trying to implement since the beginning of the war.
The seizure of the airfield in Hostomel, the landing of a large landing force there, and a quick operation to seize downtown Kiev in February was his idea.
He is also the author of other plans, so far unrealized, to encircle the eastern grouping of the AFU, to land paratroops in Odessa and Dniester Estuary, and to attack Lutsk and Lviv.
When the victorious march of February turned into a series of defeats, Gerasimov, according to officers of the General Staff, was furious.
He blamed the failure on the performers, up to the commanders of the units, swore at the supply companies that had stolen the entire army. On the PMCs, who failed the task of taking control of the entrances to Kiev and key intersections on the way to the city center.
After the February defeats and the abandonment of his plans for new adventurous offensives in southern Ukraine, Gerasimov withdrew from command of the group for several months and did not get involved with the generals on the ground.
In the summer he was engaged in developing plans for new offensives, for which mobilization was necessary. One such plan, the main one, was an attack on Lutsk-Lvov, in Gerasimov's view, capable of ending the war and leading Ukraine’s surrender.
The appointment of Surovikin as commander of the group, according to our sources in the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, was not a "victory of Prigozhin," but a decision by Gerasimov himself, who had suggested surrendering Kherson back in spring. Surovikin put this idea of his chief into practice.
Gerasimov's plans for the Lutsk-Lviv offensive were presented to Putin as a recipe for victory in the war. Gerasimov, according to sources in the General Staff and the Security Council, had told Putin several times that he wanted to personally lead the operations so as to avoid a repeat of the February failure.
At the end of December, Putin gave such permission, making Gerasimov responsible for future victory or defeat.
On January 10, at Gerasimov's suggestion, General Lapin was appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces. Lapin is an ideal subordinate for Gerasimov. He follows the commander's orders to the comma, does not show unnecessary initiative (however, it is also important), does not ask unnecessary questions, and is always ready to "rat out" those who disagree or want to disobey to the commander.
The ideal candidate for chief of staff of the ground forces, which will bear the main burden in the coming offensive operations. On January 11, the head of the General Staff became commander of the group, and "Prigozhin's man" Sergei Surovikin became his deputy.
The first thing Gerasimov did even before his appointment was to redeploy army units from Bakhmut to Soledar and it was their forces that broke through the AFU defense in this area. He used some of the ammunition stockpile accumulated by Surovikin (we wrote that the "ammunition famine" in the Russian Armed Forces was artificial and was caused by the accumulation of munitions for offensive actions).
The second - forced the PMCs to cooperate with the army. The mercenaries were engaged in urban warfare in Soledar after breaking through the defense outside the city.
Immediately after his appointment, according to several sources in the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Gerasimov checked the level of readiness of the Russian grouping located in western Belarus (Lutsk direction), and then he started checking the units standing in the Belgorod region (Kharkov direction).
Valery Gerasimov, according to his coworkers and subordinates, thinks in big numbers and big plans. The events of the fall and early winter show that he got everything he needed to implement these plans.
The group has grown to over 700,000 men, and up to 200,000 more are waiting for orders, running around in saunas and massage parlors in Russia's far-flung home front.
The artillery munitions have been accumulated for active combat operations on several fronts within a month. The equipment has been scraped together.
Valery Gerasimov will need some more time (a week to two weeks) to get to grips with his recently acquired holdings (the entire army). After that, he will begin to implement his ideas.
It is good that the Armed Forces of Ukraine know what to expect from Gerasimov (as this plan is not actively announced by Z-channels like the coming attacks on Kiev and Chernihiv). Not pleasant that the plans of the man with watery eyes will drive tens of thousands of people on both sides to the grave.
"He always wanted to fight like in the Great Patriotic War (WW2). So that divisions would march in the fields, artillery would level cities to the ground, and he will have hundreds of thousands (of soldiers at his disposal), not just tens of thousands, and officers constantly looking into his mouth," says an officer of the General Staff of the Armed Forces who served with Gerasimov even before the General Staff.
This assignment is a harbinger of the imminent intensification of hostilities. And on a scale that has not been seen since the beginning of the war.
Quite interesting and informative